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Three topics are examined using discrete choice models to estimate demand and 
consumer surplus for recreation trips. The first topic involves recreation 
nonparticipation and the choice to participate in a recreational activity. In recreation 
demand models that examine the general population, nonparticipation is usually 
estimated as the probability mass on zero demand given a positive level of expected 
demand and a discrete distribution of demand outcomes. Researchers have attempted 
to improve predictions of nonparticipation by modifying the parameters of the demand 
distribution. This study departs from previous approaches by explicitly incorporating 
nonparticipation into the behavioral model. The choice to participate is described by a 
distribution of preferences combined with a choke price on individual demands to 
distinguish participants from nonparticipants. The model is applied to a recreational 
activity in South Carolina called shrimp baiting and is found to accurately predict 
nonparticipation and the size of the user group.  
The second topic involves the estimating recreation demand models that 
account for fixed annual recreation fees. Models of recreation behavior have typically 
ignored the role of fixed annual fees, such as the fee for a recreational license, in 
determining choice and welfare. The second study demonstrates how techniques from 
the literature on discrete-continuous choice and two-part tariffs can address a situation 
where fixed annual fees are essential to determining the choice of a recreation site. 
Accounting for value captured by fixed fees can influence the way resource changes 
are assessed. 
 The third study proposes a new way to incorporate income effects in logit 
models with repeated choices. The repeated-logit specification, commonly viewed as a 
series of independent discrete choices, is instead viewed as a system of continuous 
demand equations. In the demand-system context, repeated logit satisfies integrability 
conditions for the existence of an underlying utility function while retaining desirable 
modeling properties such as allowing for income effects together with Marshallian 
cross-price effects. Relative to previous welfare measures for repeated logit, the 
proposed approach overcomes the problem of independent choice occasions and 
permits the computation of theoretically supported Hicksian welfare measures.   
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CHAPTER 1: 
RECREATION NONPARTICIPATION AS CHOICE BEHAVIOR RATHER 
THAN STATISTICAL OUTCOME 
In addition to demand and welfare estimation, models of recreation behavior should be 
able to provide reasonable predictions of the number of participants in a recreational 
activity. In models that attempt to address the issue, a common difficulty is the 
tendency to overestimate the size of the participant group and underestimate the extent 
of nonparticipation. Another difficulty is that welfare estimates often change 
substantially when models are adjusted to better predict nonparticipation. This article 
proposes a recreation demand model that estimates the number of participants quite 
accurately for the data examined while closely reproducing welfare estimates obtained 
from more commonly used methods.  
Researchers may be interested in estimating changes in the number of 
recreation participants for several reasons. Public support for recreational amenities 
depends in part on the number and types of participants as well as the total demand for 
trips. Examining the participation rate may be especially important to understanding 
long-term changes in the popularity of certain activities. For activities that require a 
license, policies that affect the number of participants have direct consequences for 
license sales and revenue. If license fees are used to control the burden of use on a 
resource, policymakers may be interested in the welfare implications of alternative fee 
policies and the resulting changes in participation and demand. 
This study examines a licensed recreational activity in South Carolina called 
shrimp baiting and finds that models available in the literature provide poor 
predictions of the number of recreation participants. Previous models have typically 
estimated nonparticipation as the mass on zero demand given positive expected 
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demand and a discrete distribution of demand outcomes. In the proposed model 
nonparticipation arises from a distribution of preferences rather than a distribution of 
outcomes. Continuous preferences are mapped to discrete choice outcomes by 
estimating a choke price on individual demands that distinguishes participants from 
nonparticipants. Given the discrete nature of an individual’s demand for trips and the 
likely hurdle effect of an annual license fee, the inclusion of a choke price for 
individual demands seems like a realistic refinement for the activity examined.    
1.1 Literature Review 
Interest in understanding the extent of nonparticipation first arose in the context of 
onsite recreation surveys in which nonusers were truncated from the data. Avoiding 
truncation bias requires an implicit estimate of the size of the nonuser group so that the 
demand response to price can be determined using valid cross-sections of the full 
population rather than conditional on positive trip demand. Smith and Desvousges 
(1985), Smith (1988) and Shaw (1988) were among the first to introduce estimators 
for truncated data, exploring a variety of continuous (such as Tobit) and discrete (such 
as Poisson) specifications. Grogger and Carson (1991) extended Shaw’s truncated 
Poisson estimator to allow greater heterogeneity in observed demands using a negative 
binomial specification developed by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) and 
Cameron and Trivedi (1986). Around the same time full-population models evolved 
from zonal to individual-level specifications, requiring the development of Tobit or 
Poisson-type estimators that could account for censoring at zero and a large number of 
zero-demand observations (Bockstael et al. 1990; Smith 1988; Hellerstein 1992). 
Truncated estimators predict the size of the nonuser group by fitting the 
observed pattern of positive demands to a truncated parametric distribution. Whether 
such an approach is adequate was questioned by Yen and Adamowicz (1994), who 
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found large differences in welfare estimates when comparing truncated to full-
population estimators. The mismatch between distributional assumptions and the 
pattern of observed individual demands was further identified as a problem of “excess 
zeros” in full population models by Gurmu and Trivedi (1996), Haab and McConnell 
(1996) and Shonkwiler and Shaw (1996). These authors developed hurdle models 
based on Mullahy (1986) whereby Poisson and negative binomial specifications 
include a nonparticipation spike to increase the probability mass on zero demand. 
The preceding developments occurred primarily in the context of single-site 
models. In the multiple-site context, Englin and Shonkwiler (1995) applied a truncated 
negative binomial estimator in a system of site-demand equations. Herriges, Kling, 
and Phaneuf (2004) addressed nonparticipation in a multiple-site Kuhn-Tucker model. 
Like the Tobit model, the Kuhn-Tucker model fits trip demand to a continuous 
distribution and allows a portion of the distribution to fall below the threshold for 
positive demand. The Kuhn-Tucker model was combined with a nonparticipation 
spike in von Haefen and Phaneuf (2003), and the same study also added a 
nonparticipation spike to a negative binomial demand-system framework. In the 
repeated-logit context, Morey et al. (1995) noted the difficulty of accounting for a 
large number of nonparticipants when nonparticipation is represented by a succession 
of independent no-trip choices. The repeated nested-logit model of participation was 
updated by von Haefen, Massey, and Adamowicz (2005) to include refinements 
previously applied to other estimators. A nonparticipation spike augmented the share 
of zero demands and a randomized no-trip constant added heterogeneity to the demand 
distribution. 
This study examines nonparticipation spikes and demand heterogeneity as 
tools for addressing nonparticipation in the nested logit context. The results are 
compared to those of an alternative model more closely related to the underlying 
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choice process that determines participation decisions. In the proposed model, the 
nested-logit demand function for annual trips is expanded into a distribution of 
individual demands by randomizing the no-trip constant as suggested by von Haefen, 
Massey, and Adamowicz (2005). If all individuals in this behavioral model were to be 
viewed as participants, an estimate of nonparticipation could still be obtained from the 
mass on zero demand predicted by the binomial-form likelihood function. This is the 
basic approach used in previous discrete-form models. Instead, the proposed model 
applies a participation threshold to the distribution of preferences represented by the 
random no-trip constant. This is similar to continuous specifications such as the Tobit 
or Kuhn-Tucker models in that the share of nonparticipants can take up any portion of 
the preference distribution and is not constrained by the parameters of a discrete 
probability function. Finally, the participation threshold is connected to the behavioral 
demand model because it corresponds to a choke price on individual demands.  
1.2 Model 
The proposed model is based on the widely used repeated nested-logit specification 
for annual demand attributed in the recreation demand literature to Morey, Rowe, and 
Watson (1993). The site-choice probabilities for site j and individual n are described 
by: 
(1) 
∑
=
j
nj
nj
nj sV
sV
e
eP . 
Site utilities Vnj consist of preference parameters β multiplied by xnj, representing 
prices (travel cost) and site characteristics. The scale parameter s is from the upper-
level participation nest. Probabilities for the upper-level nest can be expressed 
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separately from the site-choice probabilities, allowing participation for each of D 
choice occasions to be collected into a single expression. Annual trip demand Tn is 
given by: 
(2) 
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V0 is the utility of alternative activities. The number of choice occasions D is selected 
by the researcher, setting an upper limit on predicted demand for an individual in a 
season. The scale parameter s helps define the shape of the demand function.  
It is useful to distinguish individuals of type i, defined by demographic 
characteristics, from individual observations n. Participation models are often 
estimated for a representative agent (e.g., Parsons 2004). That is, all individuals ni of a 
given type i are assumed to take trips according the demand function in (2), where V0 
is interacted with demographic variables. There is no mechanism to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity in annual demand, and no specific distinction between 
participants and nonparticipants. This restriction can be relaxed by introducing a 
distribution for V0 that captures unobserved heterogeneity. A threshold value V0* will 
distinguish those who participate from those who do not. Based on these refinements, 
the probability of taking a trip for participant n of type i is described by an expectation 
over ƒ(V0) truncated at V0*. Annual trip demand is given by: 
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The preference distribution ƒ(V0|zi) is conditional on demographic characteristics zi, 
and an observed individual is viewed as a random draw from this underlying 
demographic group. Note that lower values of V0 are associated with greater trip 
demand since the utility of taking a trip is higher by comparison. Expected demand for 
trips conditional on participation therefore corresponds to the integral over ƒ(V0|zi) 
below V0*. The term V0* is identified in (3) as specific to a given location ln because it 
depends on the proximity of recreation sites as determined by an individual’s place of 
residence. As sites become more distant the threshold for participation is expected to 
become more restrictive. 
Consider the specification of V0*. Each draw from ƒ(V0|zi) denotes preferences 
associated with a specific level of consumer surplus obtained from participation. The 
threshold between participation and nonparticipation occurs at the point of 
indifference where any costs associated with participation are just offset by the 
anticipated benefits. If C is the cost of entry, the point of indifference can be expressed 
using the log-sum formula for consumer surplus in a nested logit: 
(4) 
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The difference in (4) represents the loss of access to all sites. The parameter βp is the 
coefficient on travel cost. Rearranging (4) gives: 
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(5) 
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For a licensed activity the cost of entry C must at least include the annual 
license fee, but it may also be greater than the fee. Note that the standard formula for 
consumer surplus on the right-hand side of (4) assumes an infinite choke price for 
annual trip demand. If the choke price in the absence of a license fee is less than 
infinite, then C > 0 without the fee and C > fee when a fee applies. Also note that the 
choke price varies across individuals because it is defined implicitly by ƒ(V0|zi) in 
addition to the constant C. For two participants facing similar prices, the one with a 
lower V0 accepts a greater increase in price before his consumer surplus is reduced to 
C and he is induced to exit from the activity. 
To construct the likelihood function, the probability of taking a trip on a given 
choice occasion for individual n of type i, conditional on participation, is raised to a 
power representing the individual’s observed trips. An analogous expression describes 
choice occasions when no trip is taken. The resulting contribution to the likelihood 
function for annual demand by participant n is:  
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Participation is defined by the purchase of a license. The probability of buying a 
license for an individual at location ln is given by the cdf associated with ƒ(V0|zi) below 
the threshold for participation V0*: 
(7) ( )[ ] ( )∫
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Let 1=nb  if individual n bought a license, zero otherwise. License demand for 
individual n contributes the following term to the likelihood function:  
(8) ( ) ( )[ ]{ } ( )[ ]{ }( )nninniin bb lVFlVFbP −−= 1*0*0 1 . 
Finally, recalling (1) let the site-choice probabilities for observed trip t 
be nj
t
nj PP =  and let 1=tnjy  if individual n chose site j on trip t and zero otherwise. The 
likelihood function is given by: 
(9) ( ) ( )( )∏∏∏
∈Bn tj
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n
n
yPTPbP . 
The first product accounts for the license purchase decisions of all individuals in the 
sample. For subgroup B of individuals who purchased a license, the likelihood 
function also includes annual demand and site-choice decisions. The likelihood 
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function is maximized over the preference parameters β, the nested-logit scale 
parameter s, the cost of entry C, and the moments iV 0  and σ02 describing ƒ(V0|zi).  
1.3 Application 
The proposed model is applied to a kind of recreational shrimp harvest in South 
Carolina called shrimp baiting. Shrimp baiting takes place over two months each fall 
and involves the placement of bait in shallow water to attract shrimp, which are then 
collected in a net. The primary destinations for shrimp baiting are Beaufort, St. Helena 
Sound, Edisto Island, Charleston, Bulls Bay, and Georgetown. Shrimp baiting is a 
licensed activity, and the state administered a survey to license holders in 2002 for 
monitoring purposes. The survey was sent to a random selection of 3,550 license 
holders out of a total 13,098 license holders in the state. The response rate was 40.1 
percent, yielding a sample of 1,425 people and 5,570 trips. The annual license fee in 
2002 was $25. 
Preferences ƒ(V0|zi) are represented by a normal distribution with mean 
00 VV i =  + γ zi and standard deviation 0σ . The term γ zi captures interactions between 
the no-trip constant and demographic variables. To focus on model performance with 
respect to participation rather than the value of particular site characteristics, the 
utilities for each site are represented by alternative-specific constants. Also, 
demographic characteristics for nonparticipants are not available on the level of 
individual observations. Demographic variables therefore enter the model based on 
zip-code level data available from the U.S. Census (using the Census-designated Zip 
Code Tabulation Areas). Previous studies that have used aggregate-level variables 
include Shonkwiler and Englin (2005), Englin, Boxall, and Watson (1998), and Englin 
and Shonkwiler (1995). The advantages and drawbacks of using aggregate data are 
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discussed in Hellerstein (1995) and Moeltner (2003). An overview of variables used in 
the model is presented in Table 1.1.  
Table 1.1. Sample Summary Statisticsa  
    Standard   
Variable   Units Average Deviation Maximum Minimum 
Distance  Miles 145 69.5 296 1 
Median Age Years 36.6 4.4 56.6 19.7 
Median Income $1,000/Year 34.4 9.6 75.8 9.4 
Race = White % of Population 63.7 22.5 100.0 4.2 
aDemographic variables represent aggregate figures assigned to respondents by zip 
code of residence. 
Travel cost from an individual’s zip code to each of the sites included 
monetary and time-related costs. Monetary costs were calculated as round-trip 
distance in miles multiplied by 35 cents per mile, divided by 2.5 to reflect the average 
number of participants in a vehicle. This estimate of marginal per-mile driving 
expenses was based on data from the American Automobile Association. Travel time 
was estimated as distance divided by 40 miles per hour. The cost associated with 
travel time was valued at one-third the wage rate, following studies such as Train 
(1998), Parsons, Massey, and Tomasi (1999), and Moeltner (2003). Since most 
participants in shrimp baiting are men, the wage rate was approximated by the median 
hourly earnings for South Carolina males.  
Model parameters were estimated using maximum simulated likelihood. The 
site-choice component is simple logit and does not require simulation, and the demand 
for licenses was estimated using the cdf function in GAUSS for a normal distribution. 
Estimation of the demand for trips required simulation using random draws of V0 from 
the tail of a normal distribution. This was accomplished by drawing from a standard 
uniform density, multiplying each draw by the normal cdf Fi[ ( )nlV *0 ], then taking the 
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inverse normal cdf of the result. Details of this procedure for drawing from truncated 
univariate densities are given in Train (2003). One thousand draws for each 
observation were used in estimation. An appendix that reviews the model equations 
and presents the GAUSS code used in estimation is available in (forthcoming). 
1.4 Results 
Table 1.2 presents parameter estimates for the proposed “choke price” model along 
with several others. The site-choice model is simple logit. For the remaining models, 
let LNL be an individual’s contribution to the likelihood function in a simple nested 
logit based on (1) and (2). The nested logit estimated in Table 1.2 is based on LNL(zi), 
where V0 is represented by 0V  interacted with demographic variables zi. The panel 
random coefficients model expands the nested logit to account for heterogeneity in 
annual demand by applying a normal distribution to V0. An individual’s contribution 
to the likelihood function becomes 
( ) 00 dVzVfLL iNLP ∫
+∞
∞−
= .  
This form for the nested-logit panel model was estimated previously by von Haefen, 
Massey, and Adamowicz (2005) and is similar to negative binomial estimators used by 
Haab and McConnell (1996), von Haefen and Phaneuf (2003), and others. 
The hurdle model adds a nonparticipation spike to the nested logit model. An 
individual’s contribution to the likelihood function becomes LH = (IT=0)π + (1 – π) 
LNL(zi). The indicator function equals one when an individual’s demand for trips is 
zero. This expands the share of zero demands by π and also excludes this share of 
individuals from the behavioral model. A logistic form was used for π with  
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Table 1.2. Model Parameters 
 Site Choice Nested Logit Panel Hurdle Choke Price 
Variable Model Model Model Model Model 
Log Likelihood -6,360 -56,488 -33,467 -39,224 -35,954 
           
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Travel Cost (βp) -0.12 (47.6) -0.12 (46.0) -0.12 (47.6) -0.12 (47.6) -0.12 (47.6) 
Beaufort 3.12 (33.9) 3.20 (32.9) 3.16 (33.9) 3.12 (33.8) 3.16 (34.4) 
St. Helena 3.29 (33.1) 3.39 (32.1) 3.33 (33.1) 3.29 (33.0) 3.33 (33.5) 
Edisto Island 0.95 (10.4) 1.03 (10.7) 0.97 (10.4) 0.94 (10.3) 0.98 (10.8) 
Charleston 1.22 (17.0) 1.27 (17.0) 1.24 (17.0) 1.21 (16.8) 1.24 (17.3) 
Bulls Bay 2.28 (32.1) 2.31 (30.6) 2.30 (31.9) 2.28 (32.0) 2.29 (32.3) 
S - - 4.57 (34.9) 3.21 (32.3) 22.09 (9.5) 5.88 (7.6) 
0V  - - 9.44 (97.3) 26.94 (72.3) 1.98 (15.5) 11.72 (9.6) 
0V  X Age - - -0.031 (10.9) -0.054 (7.0) 0.017 (4.7) -0.026 (4.5) 
0V  X Income - - -0.009 (5.6) -0.045 (15.3) -0.002 (1.1) -0.011 (3.5) 
0V  X Race - - -0.38 (4.0) 0.05 (0.9) -0.23 (1.9) -0.13 (0.9) 
0σ  - - - - 7.69 (87.2) - - 2.61 (7.6) 
Hurdle Dummy - - - - - - 7.54 (41.5) - - 
Hurdle X Age - - - - - - -0.57 (11.0) - - 
Hurdle X Income - - - - - - -0.32 (12.9) - - 
Hurdle X Race - - - - - - 1.51 (10.7) - - 
C - - - - - - -  64.85 (3.2) 
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demographic variables zi entering linearly. This specification is the “double hurdle” 
form used in von Haefen, Massey, and Adamowicz (2005), von Haefen and Phaneuf 
(2003), and elsewhere.  
As shown in Table 1.2, asymptotic t-stats indicate that relevant tests of 
parameter significance are satisfied in most cases. The exceptions are coefficients on 
race and income, but since each of these coefficients is significant in at least one 
model they are retained across all models for consistency. The site constant for 
Georgetown is set to zero for model identification. In the nested-logit portion of each 
model, the scale parameter s is greater than one indicating consistency with a well-
behaved error distribution.  
In the choke-price model, the estimated threshold C is $65. This appears to at 
least account for the $25 cost of a license in the threshold to seasonal participation. 
The remaining $40 further defines the appropriate choke price for individual demands. 
By combining equations (5) and (2) with the parameters in Table 1.2 it can be shown 
that demand is 1.3 trips per year at the choke price implied by C. This represents the 
minimum level of demand that induces the purchase of a license. For comparison, the 
average number of trips per license holder in 2002 was 3.9 trips per year. 
A selection of results from the four models is presented in Table 1.3. Many of 
the calculations are based on standard nested logit formulas for demand and consumer 
surplus, with nonparticipation represented by the probability mass on zero demand. 
Panel model results are calculated by averaging nested logit formulas over 1,000 
draws from the distribution of the no-trip constant. Hurdle model estimates are 
calculated as (1–π) multiplied by the nested logit formulas, following Haab and 
McConnell (1996) and von Haefen and Phaneuf (2003). Choke-price model results for 
demand and consumer surplus use nested logit formulas averaged over 1,000 draws of 
V0 below V0*. The cost C is subtracted from the nested-logit estimate of consumer 
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surplus for each participant. Nonparticipation for the choke-price model is represented 
by {1 – Fi[ ( )nlV *0 ]} and license revenue is the license fee multiplied by the number of 
participants. 
The predictions of the choke-price model are statistically indistinguishable 
from actual figures for both total trip demand and number of participants. The nested 
logit accurately predicts total trips, but significantly overestimates the number of 
participants. The correction for overdispersion in the panel model and the 
nonparticipation spike in the hurdle model generate modest improvements in the 
predicted number of participants compared to the nested logit model. However, the 
estimates are still dramatically higher than the actual figures, with p-values less than 
0.001 in both cases. Furthermore, the panel and hurdle models significantly overstate 
total trip demand, suggesting that estimates of consumer surplus are likely to be 
biased. 
Additional results are examined for two resource changes: a closure of the 
Bulls Bay site, and a resource improvement at Bulls Bay. The resource improvement 
is generated by increasing the site constant for Bulls Bay by an amount equivalent to 
$10 per Bulls Bay trip. Such an improvement could represent, say, an increase in catch 
rates or an improvement in water quality (e.g., Morey, Rowe, and Watson 1993; Jakus 
et al. 1997). The changes in total trip demand and consumer surplus predicted by the 
choke price model are statistically identical to those of the nested logit model. Note 
that nested logit estimates of consumer surplus are unbiased if the conditional mean of 
demand is correctly specified (Hellerstein and Mendelsohn 1993). By contrast, the 
welfare effects predicted by the panel and hurdle models are both significantly higher.  
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Table 1.3. Comparison of Model Predictions 
     Nested Logit   Choke Price 
        Actual Model Panel Model Hurdle Model Model 
Baseline conditions        
 Total consumer surplus ($) - 1,937,688 (40,698) 14,619,591 (392,091)  16,778,074 (1,950,124) 1,899,633 (106,590) 
 Total trip demanda 51,244 51,240  (669)       235,151  (2,937)       88,416  (2,566)      50,821  (1,677)  
 Total number of participants        13,098   50,566  (652)         21,293  (310)       20,365  (440)      13,098  (485)  
 Total license revenue ($)      327,450  -  -   -  -               -  -    327,445  (12,133)  
Site closure at Bulls Bay     
 Change in consumer surplus ($)  - -130,239  (4,400)  -591,930  (20,432)  -201,208  (8,640)  -130,479  (5,968)  
 Change in trip demand                  - -3,443  (134)  -8,510  (347)  -1,017  (112)  -3,269  (210)  
 Change in number of participants                  - -3,364  (130)  -699  (30)  -13  (3)  -765  (44)  
 Change in license revenue ($)                  -  -  -   -  -                    -  -  -19,120  (1,089)  
Quality improvement at Bulls Bay     
 Change in consumer surplus ($)                  -   181,962  (4,372)     794,522  (17,804)     266,301  (8,844)    180,377  (6,986)  
 Change in trip demand                  -      4,811  (145)       11,625  (363)        1,345  (141)        4,487  (278)  
 Change in number of participants                  -       4,683  (139)            944  (32)              17  (3)       1,039  (55)  
 Change in license revenue ($)                  -  -  -   -  -                    -  -      25,973  (1,381)  
Increase in license fee from $25 to $35     
 Change in consumer surplus ($)                  -  -  -                     -  -                    -  -  -119,942  (5,072)  
 Change in trip demand                  -  -  -                     -  -                    -  -  -2,741  (132)  
 Change in number of participants                  -  -  -                     -  -                    -  -  -1,960  (279)  
  Change in license revenue ($)                  -  -  -  -  -                    -  -  62,383 (10,816)  
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses based on a parametric bootstrap procedure using 500 draws. Welfare estimates are 
in 2002 dollars. 
aThe estimate of actual total trip demand is extrapolated from the sample, with a standard error of 1,522.  
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Table 1.3 also shows the predicted effects of an increase in the license fee from 
$25 to $35. The choke price model is capable of generating these predictions because 
an increase in the license fee can be expressed as a change in the choke price on 
individual demands. While the $10 fee increase generates additional revenue, the loss 
in welfare accruing to consumers is greater than the gain in revenue. These final 
results should be viewed with caution because the data do not contain variation in 
license fees from which this effect can be directly estimated. However, as in all the 
scenarios presented, changes in license revenue represent a potentially important 
component of the value of resource use that is typically ignored in recreation demand 
studies. 
To evaluate the performance of a travel-cost model it is important to 
understand the success of the model in estimating the demand response to price. 
Figure 1.1 compares the demand predictions of the panel, hurdle and choke-price 
models to actual figures across geographic space. To facilitate the analysis, zip codes 
are assembled into groups sorted by declining inclusive value (IV) as estimated by the 
site-choice model in Table 1.2. The inclusive value statistic is part of the nested-logit 
structure in all three models in Figure 1.1 and can be viewed as a price index for 
access to sites (Hausman, Leonard, and McFadden 1995; Parsons, Jakus, and Tomasi 
1999). Put simply, if an access fee Δp is imposed at all sites then the nested logit 
formula requires that (IVΔp – IV0) / βp = Δp, where subscripts Δp and 0 indicate that the 
inclusive value does or does not include the access fee, respectively. The relationship 
between the inclusive value and demand is important to welfare estimation, because 
integrating annual trip demand over a change in the inclusive value (or Δp) generates 
the standard log-sum consumer surplus formula that appears in (4), as described in 
McConnell (1995). 
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It is clear from Figure 1.1 that predicted demand for the panel model on 
average declines more quickly than actual demand across the 10 zip code groups. In 
the hurdle model, changes in predicted demand are considerably smaller than changes 
in actual demand across most of the observed range. Bias in the demand response to 
price in these models is likely to correspond to bias in welfare estimates for a resource 
change. The choke price model appears to perform considerably better. While some 
smoothing is evident, both the trend and total level of predicted demand are 
reasonably close to the actual figures. The predictions of the nested logit are not 
included in the figure but are nearly identical to those of the choke price model. 
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Zip Code Group
T
ri
ps
 p
er
 1
,0
00
 P
eo
pl
e
Actual Trips
Panel Model
Hurdle Model
Choke Price Model
Note: Error bars indicate 95-percent confidence intervals based on a parametric bootstrap procedure using 500 draws.  
Figure 1.1. Comparison of trip demand predictions. 
Figure 1.2 shows the number of participants per 1,000 people based on the 
same zip code groups as Figure 1.1. In the panel model, the predicted number of 
individuals with positive demand consistently exceeds the number of licenses 
purchased. Since 22 percent of license holders in fact had zero trip demand, the panel 
model predictions would fare even worse in a direct comparison to active participants. 
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In the hurdle model, a muted response to price is again evident in the very modest 
decline in predicted participation across space. The choke-price model captures 
observed behavior reasonably well, with respect to both the response to price and the 
total number of participants. 
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Figure 1.2. Comparison of participation predictions. 
1.5 Conclusions 
Allowing for heterogeneity in individual demands is a common approach to 
addressing nonparticipation in discrete-form models. One difficulty with this approach 
is the potential for bias in predictions of total demand. Instructive examples include 
Gillig, Ozuna, and Griffin (2000) and von Haefen and Phanuef (2003) who, 
respectively, identified significant underprediction and overprediction of demand 
using negative binomial estimators. Bias in demand predictions was also evident in the 
panel nested logit estimated for this study, which introduced heterogeneity in annual 
demand using a normal distribution for the no-trip constant. These and other related 
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specifications rely on a behavioral model that treats all individuals as participants, in 
the sense that expected demand is constrained to be positive over the entire range of 
preferences. The model developed in this study divides the preference distribution into 
participants and nonparticipants by incorporating nonparticipation into the behavioral 
model. A choke price defines each individual’s participation threshold, and demand is 
estimated conditional on the choice to participate. The proposed model produced 
reasonable estimates of both nonparticipation and trip demand, and an examination of 
the demand response to price supported the validity of corresponding welfare 
estimates. 
A nonparticipation spike is often used to augment the share of zero demands in 
nested-logit or negative binomial models. Like the choke price model, the resulting 
hurdle model uses a distribution of preferences to distinguish participants and 
nonparticipants and may improve predictions when the share of zero demands exceeds 
what is accommodated by a parametric discrete-form probability function. However, 
the hurdle model imposes for the share π of nonparticipants a class of preferences that 
precludes any behavioral response to price or resource characteristics. This form for 
preferences may seem like an implausible approximation (Phaneuf and Smith 2005). It 
may also limit the ability of the model to accommodate observed changes in behavior. 
In the example estimated for this study, the exclusion of the share π  from the 
behavioral model appeared to create significant attenuation in the demand response to 
price.  
For South Carolina shrimping, accurate predictions of the number of 
participants were useful for estimating changes in license revenue. Standard nested 
logit nets out license fees and other costs to the consumer because the representative-
agent function for demand is analogous to a market-level demand curve. In models 
that estimate individual-specific demands without an explicit choke price, the 
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treatment of license fees is less clear. One could argue that value generated by the use 
of a resource should not be ignored simply because it has been transferred from the 
consumer to the licensing authority. For the resource changes examined in this study, 
accounting for changes in license revenue would increase welfare estimates by 
approximately 15 percent. Total license fees in the U.S. for fishing and hunting alone 
amount to over $1 billion (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2002) suggesting that 
conventional models may be ignoring a significant portion of the value of recreational 
use. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
ANNUAL FEES AND RECREATION CHOICE 
In most recreation demand models the source of information about preferences is data 
on recreation trips. Demand for trips is regressed on trip prices and site characteristics 
to obtain estimates of preference parameters. A problem may arise if consumer 
choices are influenced by annual fees in addition to per-trip prices. For example, 
coastal towns in Massachusetts each sell a separate recreational license for access to 
local shellfish beds and annual license fees vary across towns by $100 or more. A 
researcher may wish to examine shellfishing demand and substitution throughout the 
region, but a multiple-site model of recreation trips would fail to account for the 
annual fees and would falsely ascribe the reduced demand in high-fee towns to local 
resource characteristics. Methods applied in the recreation demand literature typically 
ignore the role of fixed fees and cannot address this type of situation.  
Motivated by this problem we develop a discrete-choice random-utility model 
that accounts for the influence of annual user fees on recreation behavior. The utility 
of purchasing a license at a given site depends on the value of trips to the site, which is 
a function of trip prices and site characteristics. Utility accounts for the influence of 
annual fees because consumers evaluate a tradeoff between the cost of a recreational 
license and the value of recreation trips. The model combines techniques commonly 
used in recreation demand with methods drawn from the literature on discrete-
continuous choice and two-part tariffs. 
The model may be of interest in several respects. First, we show that the 
consumer response to both annual fees and per-trip prices can be combined in a 
consistent model of recreation behavior. The approach we develop may be applied to 
other recreation-demand problems in which fixed annual expenses play an essential 
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role in consumer choice, for example, the purchase of a season pass at a ski area, the 
selection of a marina by recreational boaters, or the purchase of a house that affords 
access to local recreation amenities. Second, our study represents a new application of 
recent advances in modeling recreation participation. Specifically, English (2008) 
extended random-utility models of site choice and annual trip demand to account for 
the choice whether to participate in a recreational activity. We find that similar 
modeling techniques are useful in addressing site-specific fees, which present the 
consumer with the analogous choice of whether to participate in recreation at a 
particular site. Third, we compare welfare measures based solely on value that accrues 
to consumers with welfare measures that account for value transferred to the 
government in the form of license fees. Our approach is more consistent with the 
literature addressing other economic choices governed by a two-part structure of fixed 
and unit prices, and may be appropriate for the analysis of resource policies in many 
cases. 
2.1 Background 
The use of random-utility models to examine the choice of outdoor recreation sites has 
a long provenance. A summary of the major developments is presented in Herriges 
and Kling (2003) and Phaneuf and Smith (2005). To our knowledge the role of annual 
fees in recreation choice has been previously addressed only in English (2008), which 
examined consumer behavior in the presence of a statewide license fee for a particular 
recreational activity. Our analysis of fixed fees specific to particular sites requires a 
different modeling approach, though we adopt some elements of English (2008), as 
described below. Another instructive precedent in the recreation demand literature 
involves repeated-logit models, first developed by Morey, Rowe, and Watson (1993) 
and later applied in numerous studies (e.g. Montgomery and Needelman 1997; 
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Parsons, Jakus, and Tomasi 1999; MacNair and Desvousges 2007). While our model 
bears little theoretical relationship to repeated-logit analysis, we adopt the logistic 
specification for demand implicit in the repeated-logit model because it has desirable 
properties for the analysis of recreation trips.  
Aside from these examples, the techniques we draw upon for the methods 
proposed in this article were primarily developed outside the field of recreation 
demand. The topics most important to our analysis include discrete-choice methods 
based on random-utility maximization, the extension of discrete-choice analysis 
known as “discrete-continuous choice”, and “two-part tariff” models evaluating choice 
and welfare when prices involve both fixed and variable components.   
In models based on random utility maximization, an individual’s choice among 
discrete alternatives is described by conditional indirect utilities associated with each 
alternative (McFadden 1974). Conditional indirect utilities define the maximum utility 
an individual can achieve conditional on the choice of a given alternative. Utility 
depends on characteristics of the alternatives as well as factors specific to the 
individual. Some of the individual-specific factors are not observed by the researcher, 
so conditional indirect utilities are specified to include a random component drawn 
from a population-level distribution of preferences. Choice probabilities are estimated 
by integrating the individual’s utility decision rule over the population-level 
preference distribution to identify the portion of the distribution associated with the 
choice of each alternative. This general approach is common to all random-utility 
models and is reviewed in detail by Train (2003). 
The purchase of a recreational license combined with the decision of how 
many trips to take is similar to other choices that occur in two related stages, and may 
be viewed in the context of “discrete-continuous” models. These models use 
conditional indirect utilities to describe the discrete first-stage choice, combined with a 
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continuous function that predicts the quantity demanded of the second-stage good 
(Dubin and McFadden 1984; Hanemann 1984). The demand response to price in the 
second stage of the model is related by Roy’s identity to indirect utility in the first 
stage of the model.  
In discrete-continuous models, first-stage choices may be determined in part by 
characteristics of the first-stage good (Train 1986; Bento et al. forthcoming) or may be 
determined solely by the fee for the first-stage good combined with prices and 
characteristics of the second-stage good (Miravete 2002; Narayanan, Chintagunta, and 
Miravete 2007). Our model takes the second of these two approaches, since a 
recreational license is likely to have no features of interest other than the license fee 
and access to recreation trips.  
Consumer choice in the presence of both fixed fees and unit prices has been 
widely investigated in the literature on two-part tariffs. Oi (1971) used Disneyland as 
an example and analyzed the profit-maximizing combination of an entrance fee for the 
park and a unit fee for rides. Subsequent articles have addressed two-part tariffs in the 
context of profit maximization for firms setting prices or optimization of social 
welfare for governments setting tax policy (Schmalensee 1981; Train, Ben-Akiva, and 
Atherton 1989; De Borger 2000). Throughout this literature, consumers evaluate a 
tradeoff between fees for access to a particular good and value derived from 
consuming the good, where total value from the researcher’s point of view includes 
both value accruing directly to consumers as well as value associated with the fixed 
fees. The model below extends the analysis of recreation choice to account for fixed 
fees in a similar manner. 
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2.2 Model 
The model is developed in the context of random utility maximization (McFadden 
1974; Train 2003). Let utilities {Vnj} describe license-purchase decisions, where n 
denotes individuals in the population and j denotes alternatives j ∈ J + 1. There are J 
sites where a license can be purchased and the choice not to purchase a license is 
denoted by j = 0. With nonparticipation captured in Vn0, the choice alternatives are 
exhaustive, as required by random-utility theory. We also assume that choice 
alternatives are mutually exclusive, which is the second requirement of random-utility 
models. While not strictly true for the shellfishing problem analyzed below, we 
believe this assumption is innocuous as an empirical matter because no individuals 
were identified who purchased a license in more than one location. Let Vn0 = y where y 
is annual income, and let utility for purchasing a license at each of the sites be 
described by the function  
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For individual n, the utility of choosing site j depends on a scalar D, to be explained 
below; the price of travel to the site pnj multiplied by a price coefficient α; individual 
tastes for site j represented by ηnj, which may be composed of a vector of site 
characteristics multiplied by taste parameters; an individual taste shifter θn common to 
all sites, which will assist in model estimation; personal income y multiplied by a 
coefficient βy, representing the sensitivity of shellfishing demand to income; a choke 
constant c, to be explained below; and the annual license fee Lnj. Both prices and 
license fees include the subscript n because they vary by an individual’s place of 
residence (in the application below, license fees in coastal towns differ for residents 
and nonresidents). 
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The first term in expression (1) represents utility associated with recreation 
trips to site j. The functional form is derived from repeated-logit models, as described 
below. The utility of recreation trips depends on travel costs, tastes for particular 
shellfishing sites, tastes for shellfishing generally, and income. The utility of site j also 
depends on the license fee Lnj, which is traded off directly with income. The term c 
represents costs associated with shellfishing not accounted for in travel costs or license 
fees, such as the cost of acquiring skills or equipment. Alternatively, c can be viewed 
as a shifter for utility associated with the choke price on recreation trips. Without c, 
expression (1) would imply that all individuals derive value from shellfishing trips 
whenever the license fee is zero. This is because the first term in (1) is always positive 
at any price, implying that demand for shellfishing trips has an infinite choke price. A 
positive c corresponds to a choke price that is less than infinite and allows for the 
possibility that some people would choose not to participate in shellfishing even in the 
absence of a license fee.   
Expression (1) ranks the J + 1 alternatives, including the J sites and 
nonparticipation, and each individual n selects her highest-utility option. If the utility 
derived from shellfishing trips offsets the cost of a license for at least one site, the 
individual chooses to purchase a shellfishing license. When several sites are preferred 
to nonparticipation, the individual chooses the site offering the highest utility. 
The motivation behind the functional form in expression (1) is its relationship 
to functional forms common in the recreation demand literature and its desirable 
properties in the context of recreation behavior. Specifically, we derive the demand for 
trips conditional on the choice of site j by applying Roy’s identity to indirect utility in 
expression (1). An individual’s trip demand to site j, calculated as qj = 
(∂Vj/∂pj)/(∂Vj/∂y), is given by  
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In the absence of income effects (βy = 0) expression (2) is the logistic demand function 
for trips to a single site as estimated in a repeated-logit model (Morey, Rowe, and 
Watson 1993; Morey 1999). In the context of repeated logit, the utility of site j would 
be αpnj + ηnj and the utility of alternative activities would be –θn. The scalar D would 
represent choice occasions, and would be set high enough to accommodate a 
reasonable upper limit on trips in a season. The logistic demand function is the most 
common functional form applied in the recreation-demand literature, given the 
prevalence of random-utility logit models (Phaneuf and Smith 2005). Expression (2) is 
also related to the commonly used semi-log demand function, which is a special case 
of (2) with D selected to be a large number (Hellerstein and Mendelsohn 1993; 
Parsons, Jakus, and Tomasi 1999).  
For our purposes it is desirable to take advantage of a finite D as a reasonable 
upper bound on predicted trips so that the demand function in (2) incorporates 
satiation in annual demand. Below we allow individual demand to vary according to a 
preference distribution, and functional forms that ignore satiation in individual 
demand allow for extremely large predictions of demand and consumer surplus for 
some individuals. We allow variation in tastes for recreation trips because it is 
essential to a model that accounts for the choice whether to participate in a 
recreational activity. In general, satiation in demand is a realistic feature for recreation 
demand models because time constraints place an upper limit on trip demand 
regardless of individual income.  
To complete derivation of the shellfishing model in the context of random 
utility maximization, we assume that variation in preferences across people is partly 
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associated with observed demographic variables and partly associated with individual-
specific factors unobserved to the researcher. The unknown portion of an individual’s 
utility must be represented by a probability density corresponding to the population-
level distribution of tastes. One approach would be to include an additive extreme-
value error term in (1), following Dubin and McFadden (1984) and other discrete-
continuous specifications such as Train (1986) and Bento et al. (forthcoming). This 
would result in the familiar closed-form logit choice probabilities for the purchase of a 
license. However, an additive error term would suggest that different consumers prefer 
one site over another for reasons unrelated to the remaining terms in the utility 
function, that is, unrelated to utility from recreation trips. We instead follow the 
common practice in recreation demand and assume that preference heterogeneity is 
associated with the utility of site visits, as captured by the parameters θ and η in (1) 
and (2). Specifically, a preference distribution ƒ(θ) captures heterogeneity in the 
demand for shellfishing, that is, heterogeneity in demand for trips to any of the J sites 
relative to alternative activities. The J-dimensional preference distribution ƒ(η) 
captures heterogeneity in preferences for specific sites.  
Probabilities associated with an individual’s choices are calculated by 
integrating the utility-based decision rule over the preference distribution represented 
by ƒ(θ) and ƒ(η). Selection probabilities for the available alternatives, including 
nonparticipation, are given by 
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For any realization of θ and η, the indicator function takes a value of one if alternative 
k is the highest-utility option. Integrating the indicator function over the distributions 
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ƒ(θ) and ƒ(η) identifies the portion of the probability distribution associated with 
choice k, which is equivalent to Pnk. 
2.3 Data 
The shellfishing license data consist of license purchases in 2004 by town of residence 
for 11 shellfishing sites. The data were compiled from materials provided by state and 
local resource management officials. Ten of the sites are towns along the southeastern 
shore of Massachusetts from Scituate south, excluding Marshfield, Fairhaven and 
Cape Cod. The eleventh site is the state of Rhode Island. Scituate is the first location 
south of Boston where recreational shellfishing is allowed. Marshfield did not allow 
shellfishing in 2004 and data for the town of Fairhaven could not be obtained. Cape 
Cod was not included in the analysis because it is geographically distinct from the 
mainland sites. Trips to Cape Cod sites by residents of the mainland are likely to 
involve a large number of multiple-day trips which would complicate the analysis.  
An overview of license purchases and fees is presented in Table 2.1. Sites are 
listed geographically from north to south. A total of 6,225 licenses were purchased for 
the 11 sites. Residents of a town where shellfishing is permitted pay a lower license 
fee than non-residents, and senior residents (over 65) pay the lowest fees. Rhode 
Island is included in the model to account for choices available to Massachusetts 
residents, but license purchases by Rhode Island residents are not included in the data. 
Points of origin in the travel-cost analysis include all Massachusetts municipalities 
east of Worcester and south of Boston, excluding Cape Cod. This amounts to 127 
cities and towns, and license purchases from this region account for all but 22 of the 
6,225 licenses in the data. This region also includes 15 towns where no one purchased 
a license. Participants in shellfishing include anyone who purchased a license in 2004, 
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and the number of nonparticipants is calculated by town of origin as total population 
less license holders. 
No survey was conducted for this analysis and demographic variables enter the 
model as aggregate-level data obtained from public sources. Specifically, all residents 
of the region are assigned demographic characteristics based on average statistics for 
their town of residence. Town-level data are not available from the U.S. Census and 
were instead obtained from the Massachusetts Institute for Social and Economic 
Research and a statistical guide to Massachusetts towns published by the New York 
Times Company. Demographic variables include median household income divided 
by $10,000 (“income”), the percentage of adults with a college degree (“education”) 
and the percentage of households with children under 18 (“kids”). Previous studies 
that have used aggregate-level variables include Englin and Shonkwiler (1995), 
Englin, Boxall, and Watson (1998), and Shonkwiler and Englin (2005). Some 
advantages and drawbacks of using aggregate data are discussed in Hellerstein (1995) 
and Moeltner (2003).  
Travel distances were measured from each town of origin to each of the 11 
sites. Round-trip distances were converted to prices at a rate of $0.341 per mile per 
person based on marginal driving expenses estimated by the American Automobile 
Association and one-third average hourly earnings for Massachusetts households as 
reported by the U.S. Census. Estimating the time-cost of driving using some variant of 
one-third the wage rate originated with Cesario (1976) and follows studies such as 
Train (1998), Parsons, Plantinga, and Boyle (2000) and Moeltner (2003).  
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Table 2.1. License Purchases and Fees for Shellfishing Sites 
  License Purchases   License Fees ($) 
 Shellfishing 
Site 
Non-
Residents Residentsa Seniors Total 
Non-
Residents Residentsa Seniors
Scituate  14 65 59 138 50 20 0
Duxbury 548 422 137 1,107 100 20 0
Kingston  67 109 54 230 55 25 10
Plymouth  18 539 155 712 50 10 0
Wareham  172 984 359 1,515 120 30 15
Marion  100 283 65 448 120 25 0
Mattapoisett 186 350 232 768 120 25 0
New Bedford  3 143 101 247 50 12 3
Dartmouth  13 207 123 343 75 15 0
Westport  65 477 129 671 100 25 10
Rhode Islandb 46 - - 46 200 - -
Total 1,232 3,579 1,414 6,225 - - -
a “Residents” refers to local inhabitants below the age of 65. “Senior” residents are 65 and older. 
b License purchases are not reported for residents of Rhode Island because the target population for 
the study consists of Massachusetts residents only. 
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We focus only on access value for sites so our data does not include 
information on site characteristics. The taste distribution for sites will therefore be 
estimated using J alternative-specific constants to represent the J means of ƒ(η). 
Estimating the value of site characteristics would require replacing the alternative-
specific constants with the product of site-specific variables and estimated 
coefficients. It is possible that site characteristics would provide some information 
about the value of sites that is not available from observed choices alone. However, 
most authors suggest that observed choices provide the best information on the utility 
of choice alternatives and that any mismatch with information on site characteristics 
results from the failure to adequately measure site characteristics (Hausman, Leonard, 
and McFadden 1995; Morey and Waldman 2000; Train, McFadden, and Johnson 
2000; Murdock 2006). The use of alternative-specific constants is therefore well suited 
to estimating the value of shellfishing. 
2.4 Estimation 
It would be possible to estimate the shellfishing model using equations (1) and (3). 
Repeated draws would be taken from ƒ(θ) and ƒ(η) for each individual in the sample. 
Utilities Vnj would be calculated for each draw using equation (1), with Vn0 = y. For a 
given draw, the highest value of Vnj would identify the selected alternative from 
among the J + 1 options. This process would be repeated for multiple draws. The 
number of draws corresponding to individual n’s choice of alternative k divided by the 
total number of draws for individual n gives the predicted probability Pnk. Probabilities 
could then be fit to observed choices using maximum likelihood estimation. This type 
of procedure is called an “accept-reject” simulator and is described in Train (2003).  
The number of draws required for estimation can be reduced dramatically by 
eliminating a portion of the distribution ƒ(θ) prior to simulating choice probabilities. 
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Specifically, we know that a large portion of the support of ƒ(θ) must correspond to 
the choice not to participate. This is because θ represents variation in the utility of 
access to any shellfishing site, that is, variation in avidity for shellfishing. A large 
portion of this distribution will be taken up by the great majority of people in 
southeastern Massachusetts who do not purchase a shellfishing license. Following 
English (2008), the portion of the distribution corresponding to nonparticipation can 
be estimated analytically using the cdf of θ.  
First, we find the threshold value of θ associated with an individual’s decision 
to participate at a given site j. For a given draw of ηnj at site j, we set Vnj = y in 
equation (1) and solve for θ*: 
(4) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −+−−−= +− 1ln* DLc njynjnjnj eyp αβηαηθ . 
At θ* utilities Vnj and Vn0 are both equal to y, so the individual is indifferent between 
choosing site j and choosing nonparticipation. Given the functional form of (1), values 
of θ below θ* are associated with nonparticipation. The threshold where at least one of 
the J sites is preferred to nonparticipation is given by  
( ) ( ){ }njjn ηθηθ ** min= ,  
where ηn is a J-dimensional vector. Using θ* defined over all J sites as a participation 
threshold, the estimation of choice probabilities requires simulation techniques only 
over the portion of ƒ(θ) consistent with positive demand for a license. 
Nonparticipation will be estimated using the cumulative distribution of ƒ(θ) below θ*, 
that is, F[θ*].  
Following a practice common in models of recreation participation, we assume 
that observed demographic variables zn enter the model through their influence on 
total demand for shellfishing trips. The mean of ƒ(θ) is therefore interacted with zn 
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such that nz zn βθθ += , where θ  and βz are estimated. In discrete-choice analysis, 
taste distributions represented by a single site-specific error term typically take a 
logistic or normal form. We use a normal distribution for ƒ(θ) and ƒ(η), with standard 
deviations σθ and ση. Simulation of the choice probability Pnk using an accept-reject 
simulator proceeds as follows:  
 
1. For each observation take R draws from ( )ηf  and from ( )nzf θ  above 
θ*, where θ* is conditional on each of the draws from ( )ηf . Each of 
the R draws has J + 1 dimensions, reflecting the J sites associated with 
( )ηf  and the nonparticipation alternative associated with ( )nzf θ . 
2. For each draw r set 1=rnkI  if  
{ } nkjnj VV =>0,max .  
Otherwise, set 0=rnkI . Utility V is calculated using expression (1). 
Alternatively, use logit smoothing to insure that step 4, below, never 
results in a zero probability for any choice outcome. This would require 
setting  
∑
=
=
J
j
njnkr
nk
VV eeI
1
λλ  
for all k from 1 to J, where λ is set as small as possible without creating 
difficulties in estimation. The result is that rnkI  is close to one for the 
highest-utility site and is small but nonzero for all other sites (for 
details see Train 2003). 
3. Each rnkI  describes an outcome that is conditioned on participation, 
because the draw of θ used to calculate utilities was above θ*. Remove 
the conditioning by calculating {1 – rnF ][
*θ } rnkI , where rnF ][ *θ  is the 
cumulative distribution of ( )nzf θ  up to θ* for draw r. 
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4. Calculate  
0, >knP  { }∑ −=
r
r
nk
r
n IF ][1
*θ / R. 
5. Calculate  
Pn0 = ∑
=
− J
k
nkP
1
1 .  
 
We used logit smoothing in step 2 and found that λ could be set small enough so that 
changes in λ appeared to have no significant effect on the estimated parameters.  
The form for the likelihood function is  
( )∏
nj
nj
nj
yP ,  
where observation ynj = 1 if individual n chose alternative j and zero otherwise. The 
likelihood function was estimated over all alternatives and all individuals, including 
both participants and nonparticipants. For each site given each town of origin, Pnj was 
estimated using 2,000 random draws from ƒ(η) and from ƒ(θ) above θ*. 
2.5 Results 
This section presents results of a model in which site-specific error terms ηnj are 
independently and identically distributed. The assumption of independent error terms 
is sometimes criticized in the context of discrete choice analysis because it imposes 
restrictive substitution patterns (Train 1998; Layton 2000). Extensions that include 
more general distributions for ƒ(η) were also investigated and the results are available 
from the author. The simple specification presented here is sufficient to illustrate the 
performance of the model.  
The estimated parameters are reported in Table 2.2. The travel-cost parameter 
is negative and significant. Site constants jη reflect average tastes for site-specific 
characteristics in each of the shellfishing towns. The most desirable sites for 
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shellfishing are Duxbury, Wareham, Marion, Mattapoisett, Westport and Rhode 
Island. The site constant for New Bedford is fixed at zero for model identification. The 
standard deviation of site preferences (ση) is smaller than the standard deviation of θ 
(σθ), suggesting that substitution is greater among shellfishing sites than between 
shellfishing and nonparticipation.  
Table 2.2. Model Parameters 
Variable Estimate St Err 
Travel cost (α) -0.021 (0.001) 
Scituate ( jη ) 0.267 (0.017) 
Duxbury 1.019 (0.008) 
Kingston 0.480 (0.011) 
Plymouth 0.375 (0.006) 
Wareham 1.127 (0.012) 
Marion 0.920 (0.013) 
Mattapoisett 1.032 (0.012) 
Dartmouth 0.469 (0.013) 
Westport 0.913 (0.006) 
Rhode Island 1.398 (0.018) 
St. Dev. of site utilities (ση) 0.195 (0.005) 
Utility of shellfishing (θ ) -5.980 (0.058) 
St. Dev. of θ (σθ) 0.647 (0.012) 
Choke constant (c) 41.00 (10.30) 
Income (βy) -0.065 (0.004) 
Education x θ  0.727 (0.080) 
Kids x θ  0.699 (0.099) 
  
Log likelihood -33,109   
 
The mean of the taste distribution for shellfishing trips θ  is negative and 
considerably larger in absolute value than the site constants. Given the logistic demand 
function in (2), this indicates that most individuals take considerably fewer than D 
trips in a year. Note that for estimation D was set to 60, providing a reasonable upper 
bound on annual trip demand based on information from resource managers in 
Massachusetts. The estimated choke constant c determines the choke price on 
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individual demands absent a license fee. Using equations (1) and (2) it is possible to 
show that demand at the choke price associated with c is 0.82 trips per year. This can 
be interpreted to mean that absent a license fee, individuals who are just indifferent 
between shellfishing and nonparticipation would take a little less than one trip per year 
on average. The coefficient on income is negative, indicating that shellfishing is an 
inferior good and that all else equal those with higher income are less likely to 
purchase a shellfishing license. Those with a college education and those with children 
under the age of 18 are more likely to engage in shellfishing. 
Model predictions appear in Table 2.3. Predictions of total license demand for 
each site correspond reasonably well to data on actual purchases. A comparison to 
Table 2.1 shows that nonresident license purchases are somewhat under-predicted for 
Duxbury and over-predicted for most other sites. For all sites combined, nonresident 
licenses are overestimated by 18 percent, resident licenses are underestimated by 6 
percent, and senior licenses are underestimated by less than one percent. Total license 
demand is predicted almost exactly.  
Table 2.3 also reports figures for predicted trips per license. The model does 
not use data on trips, but as a way of evaluating model results expected trip demand 
can be estimated using the equation (2) integrated over the distribution of preferences 
for shellfishing participants. Estimates range from 1.2 trips per license in New 
Bedford to 6.8 trips per license in Rhode Island. For all sites combined, average 
predicted trip demand is 2.1 trips per license. These estimates are similar to actual 
demand according to local officials at some sites, while officials at other sites indicate 
demand may be higher. While information on the actual demand for trips could be 
incorporated into the model, it is not clear that this would result in more valid 
estimates of willingness to pay for access to shellfishing sites. Willingness to pay is 
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ultimately based on expected behavior, as illustrated by the inevitable occurrence 
where some consumers pay for a license but fail to take any trips. 
The consumer value of shellfishing sites is estimated as equivalent variation 
(EV) using the expressions for utility given by equation (1). Specifically, conditional 
on draws of θn and ηn, we close a given site j by setting ηnj equal to a large negative 
number. We reevaluate utility based on the new maximum Vnj, and a numerical 
procedure then calculates EV starting with the original value of ηnj and searching for 
the income adjustment that achieves the same change in utility as the site closure. The 
change in utility would either be zero or negative, depending whether the individual 
chose the affected site initially given θn and ηnj. For each type of individual as defined 
by town of origin, EV is calculated using an average over 200 draws.  
Table 2.3 includes two types of welfare estimates. Both are expressed as value 
per expected trip (in 2004 dollars) to facilitate a comparison to per-trip values in the 
literature. Both values are based on equivalent variation associated with the loss of 
access at a site, divided by expected trip demand for the affected site under baseline 
conditions. “EV per trip” is calculated net of license fees as specified in (1). Values 
range from $5.12 per trip in Rhode Island to $10.61 per trip in Wareham, with an 
average value of $9.50 per trip for all sites combined.  
While value to the consumer is the standard figure reported in the recreation-
demand literature, one could argue that welfare measures should not exclude value 
obtained from recreation trips simply because it has been transferred from the 
consumer to state or local governments in the form of license fees. Models in the two-
part tariff literature routinely account for fixed fees in welfare calculations, and a 
similar approach may be justified for many recreational activities. The issue is 
especially relevant in the case of Massachusetts shellfishing given that annual license 
fees are as high as $120 at several popular sites. In Table 2.3, fees from predicted  
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Table 2.3. Model Results 
 License Purchases 
Shellfishing Site Non-Residents Residents Seniors Total 
Predicted Trips 
Per License 
EV Per Trip 
($) 
Total Surplus 
Per Trip ($) 
Scituate 29 47 42 118 1.6 7.47 11.14 
 (4.1) (3.6) (2.4) (9.6) (0.06) (0.19) (0.51)
Duxbury 444 644 210 1,298 2.3 9.65 24.50 
 (19.3) (18.6) (5.8) (33.6) (0.08) (0.24) (0.71)
Kingston 104 62 25 191 2.1 6.00 13.14 
 (8.7) (3.1) (1.0) (12.4) (0.07) (0.16) (0.55)
Plymouth 33 498 138 668 1.3 8.72 8.87 
 (2.6) (14.4) (4.0) (20.0) (0.05) (0.23) (0.38)
Wareham 218 912 331 1,461 2.3 10.61 24.47 
 (12.8) (21.0) (7.7) (34.8) (0.07) (0.25) (0.75)
Marion 137 197 123 457 1.8 9.92 17.66 
 (9.3) (7.1) (3.7) (17.1) (0.07) (0.28) (0.59)
Mattapoisett 289 288 184 760 2.2 9.89 20.73 
 (14.9) (9.0) (4.9) (25.5) (0.08) (0.28) (0.62)
New Bedford 0 173 101 274 1.2 6.71 -0.37
 (0.0) (9.6) (5.2) (14.7) (0.04) (0.20) (0.57)
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses based on a parametric bootstrap procedure using 200 draws. 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
 License Purchases 
Shellfishing Site Non-Residents Residents Seniors Total 
Predicted Trips 
Per License 
EV Per Trip 
($) 
Total Surplus 
Per Trip ($) 
Dartmouth 13 213 122 348 1.4 9.34 11.79 
 (2.2) (10.9) (5.0) (17.2) (0.05) (0.27) (0.44)
Westport 131 340 129 601 2.2 9.51 21.19 
 (8.8) (10.8) (3.8) (21.8) (0.07) (0.25) (0.73)
Rhode Island 56 - - 56 6.8 5.12 24.68 
 (6.2) - - (6.2) (0.19) (0.15) (0.83)
Total/Average 1,453 3,374 1,405 6,232 2.1 9.50 20.46 
  (34.3) (48.8) (25.3) (82.4) (0.07) (0.24) (0.64)
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license purchases are added together with EV from expression (1) to calculate “total 
surplus per trip”. For all sites combined total surplus per trip is $20.46, more than 
twice the consumer’s value by itself.  
Practical implications of this alternative welfare calculation are evident in the 
much broader range of estimated per-trip values, including a negative value reported 
for New Bedford. In keeping with common practice, positive per-trip values 
correspond to losses from removing a site from the choice set, so the negative value 
represents a welfare increase. Specifically, the closure of New Bedford leads to a 
reduction in deadweight loss and an increase in total surplus as people switch away 
from New Bedford to other sites from which they derive greater value. The loss of 
$6.71 per trip for consumers occurs despite the overall increase in value because a 
greater share of value is transferred away from consumers to local governments in the 
form of higher fees. Greater variation in per-trip values highlights the importance of 
accounting for annual user fees when evaluating a resource change. Resource 
management decisions based on consumer surplus alone could differ significantly 
from decisions based on total surplus.  
2.6 Conclusions 
The influence of annual fees on recreation choice has typically been ignored in 
recreation demand models. An exception is English (2008), which analyzed the choice 
whether to purchase a license for a particular activity such as fishing or hunting, 
followed by the choice among multiple sites when determining the demand for trips. 
The preceding analysis addressed another common situation in which annual fees 
influence recreation behavior, specifically, a situation where annual fees apply to 
specific sites rather than to a particular recreation activity. Many problems arising in 
recreation choice would be suited to this type of specification, including the purchase 
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of a season pass for a ski area or the selection of a marina for mooring a boat. The 
simple case in which individuals choose a single site is not a requirement, since 
choices allowing for the simultaneous purchase of multiple first-stage goods can still 
be formulated as mutually exclusive options (e.g. Train 1986; Bento et al. 
forthcoming).  
Accounting for the influence of annual fees on recreation choice can reduce 
bias in recreation demand models. Another motivation for this type of model is its 
ability to generate welfare results that directly account for value captured by annual 
fees. While license fees may be used to recover resource management costs and may 
not always represent surplus value, as a practical matter public expenditure on 
resource management may be less than or considerably greater than revenue collected 
from annual fees. The value captured in license fees must be analyzed independently 
of public expenditure on resource management if the assessment of alternative 
resource policies is to accurately account for all related costs and benefits. Although 
the total value associated with license fees is easily measured, policy analysis requires 
methods that measure changes in value associated with alternative resource options. In 
the above analysis, even the simple closure of a site involves complex changes in 
license revenue resulting from substitution to other sites where license fees apply.  
Although recreational shellfishing has not previously been evaluated in the 
literature, it may be informative to compare estimated values to those for similar 
water-based day-trip activities. A benefit transfer analysis by Rosenberger and Loomis 
(2001) reports an average per-trip value of $16.37 for swimming and $31.16 for 
recreational fishing derived from multiple studies in the northeastern United States. 
Our estimated range of $9.50 to $20.50 for shellfishing trips appears to be comparable 
to results from previous literature studies. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
HICKSIAN WELFARE MEASURE FOR REPEATED LOGIT 
It is often convenient to model consumer behavior as a series of repeated choices 
(Revelt and Train 1998; Herriges and Phaneuf 2002; Train 2003). However, 
difficulties arise when welfare analysis is the goal. Unless choices are independent of 
income, compensating payments made for price or quality changes in any given choice 
occasion will influence a consumer’s decisions in other choice occasions. Welfare 
measures available in the literature assume independence across choice occasions, an 
assumption that constrains the consumer’s response to compensating payments by 
eliminating the influence of income adjustments across repeated choices. This leads to 
bias in welfare measures because the consumer’s response to compensating payments 
is the essential feature that distinguishes Hicksian analysis from Marshallian analysis 
and allows theoretically consistent welfare measures to be obtained from revealed-
preference data.  
This article proposes a way to overcome the problem of independent choice 
occasions in repeated logit so that theoretically supportable Hicksian welfare measures 
can be computed. The analysis is described in the context of recreation demand 
models, a field in which the discrete nature of recreation choices has led to the 
widespread application of logit methods and in which the importance of welfare 
analysis for environmental valuation has spurred considerable research on welfare 
estimation. Recreation demand modeling is essential to environmental policy analysis 
because an important component of the value of environmental services derives from 
their use in outdoor recreation. Because the demand for recreation trips is likely to 
depend on income, the development of conceptually precise welfare measures for 
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outdoor recreation requires accounting for income effects in recreation demand 
models.  
Income effects in recreation demand have received the greatest attention in the 
context of demand-system models. Demand systems incorporate multiple demand 
functions for several recreation sites into a single unified model (Burt and Brewer 
1971). It is a basic result of consumer theory that an individual’s Marshallian demand 
equations for multiple goods are consistent with rational maximizing behavior if and 
only if the Slutsky matrix of substitution terms associated with the demand equations 
is both symmetric and negative semi-definite (Varian 1992). These conditions for 
theoretical validity are known as “integrability conditions”, because they derive from 
the fact that well-behaved Marshallian demand functions can be integrated back to 
obtain a valid expenditure function. Numerous articles have used integrability 
conditions to develop theoretically consistent models of recreation demand and 
welfare (Mendelsohn et al. 1992; Englin et al. 1998; Shonkwiler 1999; Moeltner 
2003). 
Unfortunately, for the functional forms commonly in use integrability 
conditions impose severe constraints on the specification of demand-system models 
(LaFrance and Hanemann 1989; LaFrance 1990; von Haefen 2002). For example, 
observed demand for a recreation site would be expected to depend on the price of 
alternative sites (such cross-price effects are typically included in single-site models, 
e.g. Parsons 2004). However, in a system of multiple demand equations based on the 
common semi-log demand function, the researcher wishing to account for non-zero 
income effects must accept the constraint of zero Marshallian cross-price effects if 
integrability conditions are to be satisfied (Englin et al. 1998; Shonkwiler 1999).  
Repeated-choice logit is a common alternative way to model annual recreation 
demand (Morey et al. 2002; Massey et al. 2006; MacNair and Desvousges 2007). 
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Repeated logit is not typically viewed as a system of site-specific demand equations, 
but is instead constructed as a series of independent choice occasions. Each choice 
occasion consists of a multinomial logit describing the choice whether to take 
recreation trip and which site to visit at a given point in time. The number of choice 
occasions is chosen by the researcher to be large enough to account for the observed 
level of total demand for any individual. The theory of random-utility maximization 
(McFadden 1974) establishes the consistency of multinomial logit with utility theory 
on the level of a given choice occasion. A utility-theoretic approach for combining 
choice occasions in a repeated-choice logit has been proposed (Morey et al. 1993) but 
has also been criticized (Herriges et al. 1999; Shonkwiler 1999; von Haefen et al. 
2004).  
Most logit-based recreation demand models ignore income effects, in part 
because it is possible to estimate a model of site choice alone without accounting for 
annual demand. It is in predictions of total annual demand that income effects are 
usually addressed in most recreation-demand specifications. Even in repeated-logit 
models that account for annual demand, most authors simply exclude the income 
variable, ignoring its possible influence on both demand and welfare estimates 
(Parsons et al. 1999; Massey et al. 2006; MacNair and Desvousges 2007).  
The first recreation demand study that addressed income effects in logit models 
was Morey et al. (1993), which developed the approach of repeated logit based on 
independent choice occasions. In the Morey et al. formulation, income is divided by 
the number of choice occasions in a year and treated as “per-period” income. Welfare 
measures are calculated separately for each choice occasion and then summed across 
choice occasions in a year to generate annual welfare measures. Morey et al. 
performed welfare calculations for a “representative” individual based on expected 
utility in a given choice occasion. One potential bias of the Morey et al. approach was 
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demonstrated by McFadden (1999). McFadden showed that when calculating welfare 
changes for the full population, the expectation should be taken over of the 
distribution of welfare measures themselves rather than over the distribution of utility 
prior to the calculation of a welfare measure. Herriges and Kling (1999) used the 
McFadden approach to analyze income effects for a single choice occasion involving a 
single recreation trip. Herriges and Kling did not specifically address the issue of 
predicting the total annual demand for recreation trips or measuring the welfare 
impacts of an environmental change over a defined period of time. Dagsvik and 
Karlström (2005) showed that the simulation methods of McFadden (1999) may in 
some cases be replaced by a closed-form solution. 
This article introduces a new way to calculate welfare changes in a repeated-
logit model using methods developed by Bullock and Minot (2006). By treating the 
demand functions implicit in a repeated-logit model as a system of demand equations, 
the proposed method avoids the representation of demand behavior as independent 
choices whose relationship to more complete annual measures of welfare is unknown. 
The Bullock and Minot methods use numerical integration to calculate the change in 
area under compensated demand functions attributable to a change in environmental 
quality. Repeated-logit welfare calculations using the Bullock and Minot algorithm are 
compared to the results of previous methods, including the application of McFadden’s 
GEV sampler to a series of independent choice occasions (McFadden 1999; Herriges 
and Kling 1999) and the logit log-sum formula that assumes income effects are small 
enough to be ignored (Small and Rosen 1981).  
The next section describes the Bullock and Minot method and its application to 
a repeated-logit system of demand equations. Consistency of the repeated-logit 
demand system with integrability conditions and with precedents in the recreation 
demand literature is investigated. The third section describes data to which the model 
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is applied, consisting of recreation trips in 2005 from throughout the Mid-Atlantic 
region to beaches in New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia.  The final section 
describes results, including the comparison of alternative welfare measures assessing 
the value of public parks to Mid-Atlantic beach recreation. 
3.1 Theoretical Approach 
An important obstacle to the use of repeated logit for welfare analysis is the 
aggregation of a series of discrete choices into a unified model. The presence of 
income effects causes interdependencies across choice occasions because 
compensating payments made for price or quality changes in any given choice 
occasion will influence consumer decisions and welfare in other choice occasions. A 
method to account for the interdependence of income effects across repeated choices 
has not been proposed. A second difficulty involves the question of how to measure 
income with respect to each successive choice. In the recreation demand literature, 
most researchers use some variant of the widely cited Morey et al. (1993) formulation 
in which income enters each choice occasion as annual income divided by the number 
of choice occasions in a year (Provencher and Bishop 1997; von Haefen 2003). 
Unfortunately, this approach leads to inconsistencies between the period over which 
income is measured and the period over which the relevant consumer choices occur. 
For example, the researcher may allocate annual income to 100 choice occasions, 
which has the effect of scaling income down by a factor of 100. Applying the rescaled 
income to observations of annual demand that are not similarly scaled down will 
distort the estimated relationship between income and demand. Analyzing annual 
demand as multiple distinct choices does not resolve this complication. The bias in 
welfare estimates arising from the assumption of independent choice occasions and 
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from rescaling of the income variable are evident in the results presented in the final 
section of this article.  
One way to address these difficulties is to model choices as a function of 
annual income and account for income-related interdependencies across choice 
occasions in a year using methods commonly applied to the analysis of annual 
demand. This article proposes an approach that treats repeated-logit predictions of trip 
demand to each of several recreation sites as a system of demand equations. The site-
specific demands are 
(1) 
( )
( ) ∑∑
∑
+
+
+
+
−
−
−++
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
j
jxnj
jxnj
j
jxnjnzny
j
jxnj
nj xp
xp
s
xpzy
s
xp
e
e
ee
e
Dt βα
βα
βαββθ
βα
/1
/1
. 
Trips tnj represent individual n’s demand for trips to site j. Demand is a function of 
each individual’s travel cost to site j (prices) pnj, site characteristics xj, individual 
characteristics zn, individual income yn, a demand shifter θ, and structural parameters 
s, α, βx, βy, and βz.  
Derived in the context of random-utility maximization, expression (1) is 
composed of D choice occasions in a year multiplied by the probability of taking a trip 
on a given choice occasion to a given site j, specified by the remaining terms in (1) 
(e.g. Morey 1999). In the demand-system context, expression (1) is a functional form 
for site-specific demands that accounts for own-price and cross-price effects through 
pnj, accounts for income effects through the coefficient on income βy, and accounts for 
site characteristics and demographic variables through βxx and βzz, respectively. The 
relationship of expression (1) to random-utility models and demand-system models is 
discussed further below. 
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It is straightforward to show that (1) satisfies symmetry of the Slutsky 
substitution matrix, the condition for integrability commonly applied in the literature 
on demand systems (LaFrance 1990; Mendelsohn et al. 1992; Shonkwiler 1999; von 
Haefen 2002). Slutsky symmetry may be expressed as  
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for any two sites i and j (and ignoring the subscript n). When the derivatives in (2) are 
calculated for equation (1), the resulting expressions are identically equal. To 
illustrate, the two terms on the left-hand side of (2) are, respectively:  
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The terms A and B are defined as  
A = ∑ +−
j
jxj xpe βα  and  
B = zy zye ββθ ++ .  
Each term in (3) and (4) that is identified by the subscripts i or j is matched by an 
identical term with the i and j subscripts reversed, so it is straightforward to see that 
the equality in (2) is satisfied. This is true without imposing restrictions on functional 
form that lead to unrealistic constraints on consumer choice, the drawback of most 
demand-system models (LaFrance 1990; von Haefen 2002).  
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Slutsky symmetry is a necessary condition for the existence of an expenditure 
function and indirect utility function that are related to Marshallian demand equations 
through the Slutsky equation and Roy’s identity (LaFrance and Hanemann 1989). Of 
the requirements for consistency of Marshallian demands with utility theory, Slutsky 
symmetry is the one condition that specifically determines the structure of the demand 
specification, as opposed to conditions that define the range of parameter values 
consistent with maximizing behavior (LaFrance 1990).  Slutsky symmetry is also 
important because it insures path independence of the integral that calculates welfare 
measures as the area under a system of demands. Without path independence, multiple 
measures of compensating variation (CV) and equivalent variation (EV) exist for the 
same price or resource change, making welfare analysis conceptually intractable and 
empirically imprecise (Silberberg 1972).    
Equation (1) is similar in form to demand-system specifications common in the 
literature. Researchers frequently specify a semi-log relationship between the demand 
for trips and variables such as income and site characteristics (LaFrance 1990; Englin 
et al. 1998; Shonkwiler 1999). Equation (1) uses a similar exponential form, which 
approaches the common semi-log demand equation when the scalar D is set to a large 
number (Hellerstein and Mendelsohn 1993; Parsons et al. 1999). However, in a system 
of semi-log demands, integrability requires that Marshallian cross-price effects be 
fixed at zero (e.g. Shonkwiler 1999), which is not the case for the system of equations 
specified in (1).  
Equation (1) is also consistent with a repeated-logit specification in which 
conditional indirect utility takes the form Vj = (1/s)( –αpj + βxxj) for the utility of sites 
and V0 = θ + βyy + βzz for the utility of alternative activities (e.g. Morey 1999). While 
an interaction between income and the utility of alternative activities (expressed as 
βyy) might seem like a natural way to incorporate income effects in repeated-logit 
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models, most repeated-logit studies exclude income from the analysis of recreation 
choice (von Haefen et al. 2005; Massey et al. 2006; MacNair and Desvousges 2007). 
In fact, the use of an income interaction in the specification for annual trip demand 
appears to be specifically avoided in some cases, for example, Parsons et al. (1999) 
compare several similar model structures and include an income interaction in all 
specifications except repeated logit. There are also indications that the use of an 
income interaction may be viewed as inconsistent with the appropriate structure for a 
random utility model (Hanemann 1999). However, an income interaction in the 
expression for V0 is mathematically identical to the use of income coefficients that 
vary across alternatives, a functional form for logit models that is recognized as valid 
(McFadden 1999; Morey 1999; Morey et al. 2003).1  
An important advantage of income interactions over alternative methods of 
incorporating income effects in repeated-logit is the flexibility to account for normal 
or inferior goods. For example, expressions for choice utilities in a logit model may 
use functional forms such as (y-αpj)0.5 or ln(y-αpj) to account for income effects 
(Morey et al. 1993; Herriges and Kling 1999). While these functional forms allow 
price sensitivity to vary with income, they are not able to express a significant 
reordering of the utility of choice alternatives in response to income. A reordering of 
alternatives is the essential requirement for income sensitivity in discrete-choice 
analysis, whereby the propensity to choose a particular alternative (e.g. to take 
recreation trips) increases or decreases with income. Income interactions allow 
considerably more flexibility in the reordering of choice alternatives in response to 
                                                 
1 The use of income coefficients that vary across alternatives can be expressed as Vj = (1/s)[α(y-pj) + βxxj] and V0 = θ + (α/s + βy)y + βzz. This is identical to the specification described above, in which Vj = 
(1/s)(-αpj + βxxj) and V0 = θ + βyy + βzz. In the second instance, the term (1/s)αy is dropped from both 
expressions because it is irrelevant to utility rankings, leaving only the interaction term βyy in the 
specification for V0. It is convenient to estimate βy by itself rather than combined as (α/s + βy) to 
provide a straightforward test of whether the difference between income coefficients across alternatives 
is significant. 
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changes in income. For example, a positive interaction between income and alternative 
activities suggests that alternative activities become more attractive relative to 
recreation trips as income rises. This would mean that recreation trips are an inferior 
good. This could be the case for fishing trips at an urban location, as rising incomes 
may enrich and expand the set of non-fishing alternatives available to urban residents. 
Conversely, diving trips to Caribbean resorts are likely to be a normal good, expressed 
by a negative interaction between income and alternative activities.  
The ability to incorporate income interactions in a repeated-logit system of 
demand equations allows the researcher to overcome the problem of independent 
choice occasions in welfare analysis for random-utility models. The assumption of 
independent choice occasions has been criticized in the literature, primarily because it 
appears to suggest the absence of diminishing marginal utility across repeated choices 
(Herriges et al. 1999; Shonkwiler 1999; von Haefen et al. 2004). A more fundamental 
problem is that the properties of welfare measurement based on independent choice 
occasions are unknown. The welfare change associated with a single choice occasion 
is of little practical use, since a change in price or quality must be evaluated over a 
defined period of time during which the price or quality change persists. The typical 
approach to a more meaningful annual welfare measure is to calculate the welfare 
change for each choice in a series of independent choice occasions, and then add 
welfare changes across choice occasions in a year (Morey et al. 1993; von Haefen 
2003). However, the division of annual behavior into multiple choice occasions 
creates difficulties for welfare analysis. While welfare can be analyzed over periods 
shorter than a year, the chosen period of time must encompass a representative 
selection of relevant choices for most individuals so that interactions among the 
choices can be accounted for. For example, a decline in the quality of a particular good 
may require a compensating payment to offset the value lost in a given choice 
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occasion. The compensating payment may in turn cause a change in demand for the 
affected good, a change in demand that may not be observed in the given choice 
occasion but is only observed in other choice occasions. In this case the period of 
analysis must encompass a large enough selection of choice occasions to fully capture 
the resulting change in demand.  
By calculating welfare as the area under a system of compensated demand 
equations, compensating (or equivalent) payments are allowed to influence consumer 
behavior across choices that take place throughout the year (or other representative 
period of time). Accounting for the consumer’s response to compensating payments 
allows theoretically consistent welfare measures to be obtained from revealed-
preference data. Until recently, it was believed that the ability to obtain income-
compensated welfare measures from observed demand was assured only for price 
changes. Specifically, for demand functions that satisfy integrability conditions but do 
not integrate to a closed-form expenditure function, the numerical methods of Vartia 
(1983) were thought to be applicable to changes in price but not to changes in quality 
(Bockstael and McConnell 1993; Smith and Banzhaf 2004; Palmquist 2005). Bullock 
and Minot (2006) showed that this is not the case, and provided two algorithms based 
on Vartia (1983) methods that calculate the value of a resource change by numerically 
integrating compensated demands derived from observed behavior. 
The Vartia (1983) numerical method calculates the area under a compensated 
demand function in a step-by-step manner. First the consumer surplus change 
associated with a small price increase is calculated using the (observed) Marshallian 
demand function. Demand is a function of income, and demand is then recalculated 
with the consumer surplus change added to income as compensation for the first price 
increase. Using the adjusted demand schedule, a second consumer-surplus area is 
traced out to calculate the compensating payment for a second price increase, and the 
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compensating payment is again added to income. This process is repeated iteratively 
until the total area under a compensated demand function is traced out.  
Bullock and Minot (2006) showed that the same process can be extended to 
changes in quality. First the complete area under a compensated demand function is 
traced out with quality at its initial level using the Vartia method. Next, quality is 
adjusted a small amount and the area under the new compensated demand function is 
traced out. The difference between the two areas is an approximation of the 
compensating variation for a small change in quality. This incremental CV estimate is 
deducted from income, generating a new demand schedule for a consumer retained at 
the initial utility level. The new demand schedule is then used to calculate another 
estimate of CV associated with a second incremental change in quality, again using 
the difference between the areas under two compensated demand functions. The 
process is repeated until the sum of incremental quality changes equals the total 
quality change, and the sum of incremental CV estimates is an approximation of total 
CV. The approximation is arbitrarily close to the true CV value as the price and 
quality increments are made arbitrarily small.  
While numerical methods can be computationally costly, many demand 
equations do not integrate back to a closed-form expenditure function or indirect 
utility function that can be used for welfare analysis. In other words, in many cases no 
solution exists to the partial differential equations ( ) ( )( )upeptpupe jj ,,, =∂∂  or  
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for all j. Since no closed-form solution exists for the integration of equation (1), 
numerical methods must be applied. In addition to the method for numerical 
integration describe above, Bullock and Minot (2006) also developed a second 
algorithm that iteratively searches for the value of CV or EV that satisfies two 
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equations with two unknowns, but this alternative approach is not used in the analysis 
below.  
3.2 A Model of Mid-Atlantic Beach Trips 
A model based on equation (1) was estimated using data on recreation trips from 
throughout the Mid-Atlantic region to 66 beaches in New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, 
and Northern Virginia. The data were collected in a 2005 using a sample of residents 
in Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The data report beach activity by 1,966 
individuals throughout the summer of 2005. The 66 beach destinations include the 
entire shoreline from Sandy Hook, New Jersey in the north to Assateague Island in the 
south, located partly in Maryland and partly in Virginia. The data report destinations 
for 3,910 beach trips by 567 people who took at least one beach trip in 2005, with an 
average of 6.9 trips per beachgoer. The data also include 1,399 people who did not 
take any beach trips in 2005. 
The data report characteristics of the 1,966 individuals in the sample, including 
age, sex, education, income, and other variables. The data also include characteristics 
of the 66 beaches, including the length and width of beaches, the level of development 
in the surrounding area, the availability of facilities such as showers and restrooms, 
suitability of the beach for surfing, and other characteristics. The price variable was 
constructed to include monetary costs, such as the cost of gasoline, highway tolls, 
beach and parking fees, as well as time costs valued at each individual’s hourly 
income. The full set of individual and beach characteristics are presented below in 
Table 3.1. Importantly, the beach characteristics include the designation of a beach as 
a park area managed by state or federal entities. The degree to which public 
management of these areas generates additional value beyond observed beach 
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characteristics forms the basis of the welfare analysis and is used to demonstrate the 
proposed welfare measures.  
Table 3.1. Model Parameters 
Coefficient Estimate t-statistic 
Travel cost (pj) 0.02 48.76
   
Beach characteristics   
Length of shoreline 0.12 4.38
Amusement park, rides, or games available 1.06 16.05
Private or limited access -0.82 -11.76
Federal park, state park, or wildlife refuge 0.36 4.09
Beach width greater than 200 feet 0.49 9.93
Beach width less than 75 feet -0.22 -2.40
Beach in Atlantic City 1.16 15.19
Recognized as good for surfing -0.21 -4.46
Located in developed area 0.67 14.16
Part of the beach is in a state or federal park 0.45 7.05
Facilities such as showers and bathrooms available 0.15 2.66
Beach located in New Jersey -1.15 -15.49
   
Respondent characteristics   
Works full time -1.07 -13.52
Works part time -0.45 -5.81
Retired -0.84 -9.77
Works at home -0.73 -8.10
Owns property on a beach -1.15 -23.17
Age 0.01 4.96
Education - high school only -0.64 -14.01
Education - some college -0.36 -8.45
Race - white -0.49 -10.90
Two-income household 0.23 5.69
Head of household -0.19 -3.49
Household size -0.05 -3.58
Self-employed -0.16 -2.47
Male -0.20 -5.72
Household income ($10,000) (yi) -0.22 -44.55
Demand shifter (V0) 6.41 44.52
Scale parameter (s) 1.50 37.23
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The demand equations in (1) were estimated using maximum-likelihood 
methods standard in repeated-logit models, as described by Morey (1999). 
Specifically, data on trips was fit to a multinomial distribution in which expression (1) 
without the scalar D enters the likelihood function once for each trip by individual n to 
site j. The likelihood function also accounts for choice occasions when no trip is taken, 
or D less annual trips. One minus the sum of expression (1) across sites (without the 
scalar D) enters the likelihood function for each choice occasion when no trip is taken. 
An alternative estimation approach typical of demand-system specifications would 
involve fitting expression (1) to observed trips to each site j using the Poisson 
distribution. This approach is likely to obtain similar results, since both the Poisson 
and multinomial distributions predict the mean number of trips to each site regardless 
of the observed distribution of trip demand across individuals in the data. The 
relationship between these alternative estimation approaches is similar to the issues 
investigated in Hellerstein and Mendelsohn (1993) and Parsons et al. (1999). 
Estimation could also proceed using the negative binomial distribution or other 
methods that more closely fit the observed distribution of individual demands 
(Hausman et al. 1984; Cameron and Trivedi 1986) though many recreation demand 
studies have found that these methods can generate unrealistic predictions at the 
aggregate level (Gillig et al. 2000; von Haefen and Phaneuf 2003). 
The estimated parameters are shown in Table 3.1. All parameters are 
significant and most of the signs agree with expectations. Possible exceptions include 
the sign on suitability for surfing, which is negative and most likely indicates that 
many people who prefer to swim avoid beaches where surfing takes place. 
Development appears as a positive attribute, likely due to the availability of bars and 
restaurants as opposed to aesthetic considerations. Importantly for the analysis below, 
the amenity value associated with beaches that are a state or federal park or wildlife 
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refuge, and beaches that include a park, is positive. As noted, the amenity value of 
parks is used for a comparison of alternative welfare measures. Also, the variable 
associated with income in negative. Given the specification in (1), this suggests that 
beach trips are a normal good whose annual demand increases with income. The 
coefficient of -0.21 for a $10,000 change in income is typical of the demand response 
to income estimated elsewhere in the literature (Bin et al. 2005; Bullock and Minot 
2006).  
3.3 Comparison of Welfare Results 
Table 3.2 shows welfare measures for the value that state and federal parks contribute 
to beaches in the Mid-Atlantic region. Six of the 66 beaches in the data set are state 
parks, federal parks, or wildlife refuges, and nine beaches in the data set include a 
state or federal park. The welfare measures in Table 3.2 estimate the change in value 
associated with elimination of the park designation and related services for these 15 
sites. The change in consumer surplus (ΔCS) is measured as the area under a 
Marshallian demand function, given the assumption that income effects are small 
enough to ignore. In other words, consumer surplus is calculated with the income 
coefficient set to zero for welfare calculations even though the coefficient is nonzero 
for the estimation of differences in demand and utility across people. EV is the 
average amount of income that would need to be withdrawn from individuals to 
reproduce the welfare loss from removal of parks and associated services. CV is the 
average amount by which income would have to be increased to compensate for the 
loss of parks. For simplicity all welfare amounts are viewed as absolute values, and 
EV and CV are expressed as deviations from the consumer surplus change for ease of 
comparison across specifications. Note that the consumer surplus estimates in the first  
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Table 3.2. Annual Welfare Measures for a Decline in Beach Quality 
   Deviation from Consumer Surplus Change 
 Change in Equivalent Compensating 
 Consumer Surplus Variation Variation 
Model/Welfare Measure ($000,000) ($000) ($000) 
Baseline model       
   Constant MUI (difference of log sums) 630.2  (76.2)  --   --  
   Demand system (Bullock-Minot) 630.2  (90.4) -283.3  (101.4) 274.1  (76.7) 
   Independent CE (GEV sampler) 630.2  (97.4) 0.0  (0) 35.2  (10.3) 
   Independent CE, ppy (GEV sampler) 630.2  (94.4) 0.0  (0) 3,493.9  (532.1) 
Choice occasions doubled      
   Constant MUI (difference of log sums) 630.2  (76.5)  --   --  
   Demand system (Bullock-Minot) 630.2  (92.9) -318.0  (112.3) 303.1  (108.7) 
   Independent CE, ppy (GEV sampler) 630.0  (92.7) 0.0  (0) 6,797.6  (1,044.6) 
Income variable omitted      
   Constant MUI (difference of log sums) 573.8  (77.3)  --   --  
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses based on parametric bootstrap procedures using 100 draws.  
 
 68 
column are expressed in millions of dollars, but deviations from consumer surplus for 
EV and CV are expressed in thousands of dollars. 
Table 3.2 includes four different approaches to welfare estimation. “Constant 
MUI” refers to the closed-form log-sum formula commonly used when the marginal 
utility of income is assumed to be constant (Small and Rosen 1981; Train 2003). 
“Demand system” applies the Bullock and Minot (2006) method of numerical 
integration to the demand equations in (1). Compensating variation and equivalent 
variation are calculated by starting with parks present and parks absent, respectively. 
A gradual shift in the compensated demand function from “with parks” to “without 
parks”, or vice versa, is accomplished using incremental adjustments to the 0-1 park 
dummies. At the same time, utility is held constant using offsetting adjustments to 
income. One version of this algorithm was run based on the suggested approach for 
multiple sites in Bullock and Minot (2006), whereby demand for one site is integrated 
first, then demand for the second site is integrated while the price of the first site is 
held at its choke price, and so on, in any arbitrary order. However, similar results were 
obtained more quickly by simulating the compensated demand function for the 
horizontal sum of site-specific demands to all sites. In applying the Bullock-Minot 
procedure, a price increment of $0.50 was used for the step-wise integration of 
demand functions, the quality change was divided into 100 incremental steps,2 and the 
                                                 
2 A small modification was made to the algorithm developed in Bullock and Minot (2006) for 
measuring the change in CV associated with step-wise changes in quality. The modification appeared to 
significantly reduce the number of incremental steps required to achieve a given level of accuracy. Let h 
be the income-compensated demand function, let V be the indirect utility function, let Δq represent a 
small change in quality, let q* represent the sum of Δq’s from previous iterations, let ΔCV represent the 
change in CV associated with Δq, and let CV* represent the sum of ΔCV’s from previous iterations. 
Instead of approximating the ΔCV (or analogously, ΔEV) associated with a small change in quality as  
Δcv = ∫
∞
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0
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a step was added that first calculated Δcv as above and then calculated ΔCV =  
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choke price was determined by setting k = 0.00001. The constant k is the level of 
demand that fixes the upper limit of integration for demand functions whose choke 
price is infinite (see Bullock and Minot, 2006, page 970).  
“Repeated choice” in Table 3.2 refers to the simulation of welfare measures 
using McFadden’s GEV sampler (McFadden 1999; Herriges and Kling 1999). For 
each individual in the sample, D choice occasions were simulated by taking draws 
from a GEV distribution and using a search algorithm to compute EV and CV 
conditional on each draw. Specifically, CV and EV for individual n were calculated by 
searching for values that satisfy the defining equations max{Vnj + εnj, Vn0 + εn0} = 
max{Vnj′ + εnj – CV, Vn0 + εn0 – CV} and max{Vnj + εnj + EV, Vn0  + εn0 + EV} = 
max{Vnj′ + εnj, Vn0 + εn0}. The boldface Vnj  + εnj describes the vector of site utilities 
before the quality change and Vnj′  + εnj describes the vector of sites utilities after the 
quality change. The specific terms for the conditional indirect utilities are Vnj = 
(1/s)[α(yn–pnj) + βxxj] for all j, Vn0 = θ  + (α/s+βy)yn + βzzn, and Vj′ = (1/s)[α(yn–pnj) + 
βxxj + βxΔxj] for all j. The term βxΔxj represents the change in the quality of 
characteristics at site j, which is equal to zero at some sites. Estimates of EV and CV 
were averaged over 50,000 draws for each individual in the sample to calculate the 
welfare estimates presented in Table 3.2.  
Methods to obtain draws from the full GEV distribution for the 66 sites would 
be intractable. Because income effects are represented using a linear interaction 
included in only a single choice utility (i.e. the choice utility for alternative activities) 
a simplified version of the GEV sampler was applied. For welfare calculations, each 
choice occasion in the repeated-choice model was simplified to the two-dimensional 
                                                                                                                                            
∫
∞
Δ−−Δ+Δ+
0
0 )],,(,,[ ***
p
dpcvCVyqqpVqqph  – ∫
∞
−
0
0 )],,(,,[ ***
p
dpCVyqpVqph .  
The refinement of ΔCV using the initial estimate Δcv is analogous to the procedure used in Bullock and 
Minot (2006) to approximate the ΔCV associated with a small change in price. 
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choice between taking a trip and choosing alternative activities. The utility of 
alternative activities Vn0 was retained as given above. Using Vn1 to represent the utility 
of taking a trip, the formula for expected utility over all recreation sites is  
Vn1 = ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛∑
j
njsVes ln1 .  
These expressions for Vn0 and Vn1 allow welfare simulation to proceed using only two-
dimensional draws from an iid extreme-value distribution that generates error terms 
εn0 and εn1 for utilities Vn0 and Vn1. This simplification is possible because the marginal 
utility of income takes only two values, and the value that it takes for a given 
increment in CV or EV depends only on the choice between trips and alternative 
activities.3 
                                                 
3 The calculation of CV (or analogously, EV) proceeds in two steps. First, the change in utility from a 
quality change is determined. Since the marginal utility of income plays no part in this calculation, 
estimation of this change in utility can take advantage of closed-form expressions for expected utility. 
The simulated choice between alternatives represented by Vn0 and Vn1, as described in the text, has an 
expected utility of  ( )10ln nn VV ee + .  
This is just a restatement of the standard formula for expected utility in a nested logit (Morey 1999) as 
given by  
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+ ∑
s
sVV
j
njn ee
1
0ln .  
The simplified two-dimensional approach therefore accurately simulates the initial change in utility due 
to a quality change. The second step in calculating CV involves restoring utility to its original level 
using a change in income. The relationship between utility and a compensating change in income is 
either α/s when a trip is chosen or α/s + βy when alternative activities are chosen. The choice to take a 
trip as a function of the terms Vn0 and Vn1 is represented by  ( )101 nnn VVV eee + ,  
which is identical to the standard formula for the choice to take a trip in a nested logit (Morey 1999), as 
given by  
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ∑∑
s
sVV
s
sV
j
njn
j
nj eee
11
0 .  
In other words, whenever any site described by Vnj is chosen in the full model, Vn1 is chosen in the 
simplified model. As noted,  
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For the three approaches to welfare estimation described thus far, the 
underlying model is estimated using annual income and compensating or equivalent 
payments are represented as adjustments to annual income. The fourth approach to 
welfare estimation included in Table 3.2, labeled “repeated choice, ppy”, uses “per-
period income” in both estimation and welfare calculations. In this approach income 
enters each choice occasion as annual income divided by the total number of choice 
occasions D used in estimation, following Morey et al. (1993). One-hundred choice 
occasions are used in the baseline model. 
A comparison of “consumer surplus” results for the baseline model in the first 
column of Table 3.2 shows that the four welfare algorithms produce virtually identical 
measures of welfare when income effects are ignored. This indicates that the number 
of steps in the Bullock-Minot approach and the number of draws in the GEV sampler 
have been set sufficiently high to simulate reliable results. By contrast, the estimates 
of EV and CV are quite different across alternative approaches to welfare estimation. 
The demand-system model using the numerical methods of Bullock and Minot 
generates EV and CV estimates that are consistent with theoretical expectations. The 
deviation of EV and CV from linear-in-income consumer surplus is small, which is 
expected given that expenditures on beach trips represent a small portion of income 
for most people. EV is less than consumer surplus and CV is greater than consumer 
surplus, which is expected for a normal good impacted by a quality decline.  
                                                                                                                                            
syV nnj /α=∂∂   
in the full model, and it is easy to show that  
syV nn /1 α=∂∂  
in the simplified model. Also,  
ynn syV βα +=∂∂ /0   
in both the full model and the simplified model. Therefore, the change in utility from a compensating 
change in income as simulated using Vn0 and Vn1 will be identical to the change in utility from a 
compensating change in income as simulated using the full model. Since the simplified model 
accurately simulates both the initial change in utility and the amount of income required to compensate 
for the change, the simplified model accurately estimates CV. 
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The repeated-choice approach to welfare analysis generates less plausible 
welfare estimates. EV is identical to the change in consumer surplus. This is because 
the utility loss from a decline in the quality of a site, given by (1/s)βxΔxj = c, will be 
exactly offset by a change in income, given by (1/s)αΔy = c, so that the income 
interaction βy has no influence over EV measures for a quality decline. Specifically, a 
quality decline will affect utility only if an individual chooses to take a trip to an 
affected site under baseline conditions (conditional on a particular draw of εnj and εn0). 
In this case, an equivalent decrease in income would be required to reproduce the loss 
in utility. While a decrease in income can eventually cause an individual to switch to 
alternative activities, so that βy would influence the utility change, this will occur at a 
loss in utility greater than the loss in utility at which the quality decline would cause a 
switch to alternative activities. Thus the equivalent payment exactly offsets the quality 
decline before the influence of βy plays any role in the welfare calculation. Since the 
initial and offsetting change in utility are both measured by a constant MUI = α/s, the 
result is that EV = ΔCS. This contrasts with the demand-system approach, in which 
equivalent income reductions are permitted to reduce the demand for trips across 
multiple choice occasions. In the demand-system approach, the quality change impacts 
a level of trip demand that is constrained by the income reductions and thus requires 
an equivalent payment that is less than ΔCS.   
While the repeated-choice measure of EV is the same as ΔCS, the repeated-
choice measure of CV is greater than ΔCS. This is because there are instances (or 
draws of εnj and εn0) when a decline in quality at site j leads a consumer to switch to 
alternative activities. The amount of income required to raise utility to its original 
level is then determined by (α/s+βy)y instead of (α/s)y. Since βy is negative, (α/s+βy) 
is smaller than α/s and a greater change in y is required to raise utility to its original 
level. In accordance with expectation, this leads to a CV that is greater than ΔCS for a 
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decline in quality of a normal good. However, the assumption of independent choice 
occasions still precludes any impact of compensating payments across choice 
occasions, so the size of CV measured in the repeated-choice approach is considerably 
smaller than CV measured using the demand-system approach.  
As noted, the fourth measure of welfare for the baseline model replaces annual 
income with per-period income. When per-period income is used, annual income is 
scaled down by a factor of 100 to account for 100 choice occasions used in estimation. 
As a result, the estimated demand response to income (that is, the coefficient on 
income generated in model estimation) increases by a factor of 100. The deviation 
between CV and ΔCS increases accordingly, and the estimate of CV is now 
approximately 100 times higher than the estimate of CV using annual income in a 
repeated-choice framework. The estimate of CV using per-period income is also much 
higher that the estimate of CV from the demand-system approach. 
To further investigate the arbitrary impact of researcher discretion on welfare 
estimates in the repeated-choice framework, an alternative model is estimated in 
which the number of choice occasions is doubled to 200. As shown in Table 3.2, this 
has only a modest effect on models estimated using annual income. Welfare 
estimation in the linear model is unchanged, while the slight change in the shape of 
equation (1) from a doubling of D leads to a slight increase in the difference between 
EV and CV estimates for the demand-system model. However, the effect on the 
repeated-choice model using per-period income is dramatic. The income variable is 
further scaled down by an additional factor of two compared to the baseline model, 
leading to a doubling of the estimated impact of income on annual demand and a 
doubling of the CV estimate for a resource change.  
A third model was estimated in which the income variable is eliminated from 
the baseline model, reflecting the common practice in repeated-logit models of annual 
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recreation demand (Parsons et al. 1999; Massey et al. 2006; MacNair and Desvousges 
2007). The third model assumes the absence of income effects, not only for the 
analysis of price and quality changes, but also in the analysis of cross-sectional 
differences across people. Omitting the income variable has a significant effect, 
leading to a 10 percent decline in welfare estimates. Table 3.2 reports the constant-
MUI welfare measure for illustration. By comparison, simply omitting income from 
the welfare calculations causes a maximum 0.05% change in welfare estimates, based 
on the demand-system measures of EV and CV relative to ΔCS. This suggests that it is 
important to include an income variable in repeated-logit models of recreation 
demand, even if income effects are ignored in the standard log-sum calculation of 
welfare changes.  
3.4 Conclusions 
Logit-based models of recreation demand are the most widely used technique for 
analyzing the direct-use value of environmental services (Phaneuf and Smith, 2005). 
Important alternatives to logit models continue to be developed, but approaches such 
as the Kuhn-Tucker model and conventional demand-system models can exhibit 
significant limitations with regard to the prediction of baseline demand (von Haefen 
and Phaneuf 2003; von Haefen et al. 2004) and the plausible representation of 
substitution patterns across sites (Shonkwiler 1999; von Haefen 2002; von Haefen et 
al. 2004). On the other hand, a drawback of logit techniques has been the assumption 
of independent choice occasions in the representation of annual demand (Shonkwiler 
1999; Herriges et al. 1999).  
This article has demonstrated that the independence of choice occasions in 
repeated-logit models is a difficulty that can be overcome. As a matter of theory, 
repeated choices need not be viewed as a series of independent choice occasions but 
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can instead be treated as a system of demand equations. A repeated-logit demand 
system was shown to be consistent with an underlying utility function based on 
symmetry of the Slutsky substitution matrix. As an empirical matter, welfare measures 
need not be derived from methods based on random-utility maximization, which 
evaluate a single discrete choice abstracted from any defined period of time over 
which welfare gains and losses must accrue. Instead, income-compensated demand 
functions implicit in a repeated-choice model can be used to generate annual Hicksian 
welfare measures based on numerical integration methods proposed by Bullock and 
Minot (2006). The empirical application to beach trips in the Mid-Atlantic region 
suggests that income is an important determinant of consumer behavior and should be 
included in the analysis of recreation demand and the valuation of environmental 
direct-use values. 
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